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Abstract 
This article aims to demonstrate the enduring relevance of Pierre Bourdieu and Luc Boltanski’s 
‘La production de l’idéologie dominante’ [‘The production of the dominant ideology’], which was 
originally published in Actes de la recherche en sciences sociales in 1976. More than three decades 
later, in 2008, a re-edited version of this study was printed in book format as La production de 
l’idéologie dominante, which was accompanied by a detailed commentary, written by Luc Boltanski 
and entitled Rendre la réalité inacceptable. À propos de « La production de l’idéologie dominante » 
[Making Reality Unacceptable. Comments on ‘The production of the dominant ideology’]. In addition  to 
containing revealing personal anecdotes and providing important sociological insights, this 
commentary offers an insider account of the genesis of one of the most seminal pieces Boltanski 
co-wrote with his intellectual father, Bourdieu. In the Anglophone literature on contemporary 
French sociology, however, the theoretical contributions made both in the original study and   in 
Boltanski’s commentary have received little – if any – serious attention. This article aims to  fill 
this gap in the literature, arguing that these two texts can be regarded not only as forceful 
reminders of the fact that the ‘dominant ideology thesis’ is far from obsolete but also as essential 
for understanding both the personal and the intellectual underpinnings of the tension-laden 
relationship between Bourdieu and Boltanski. Furthermore, this article offers a critical overview 
of the extent to which the unexpected, and partly posthumous, reunion between ‘the master’ 
(Bourdieu) and his ‘dissident disciple’ (Boltanski) equips us with powerful conceptual tools, which, 
whilst illustrating the continuing centrality of ‘ideology critique’, permit us to shed new light on 
key concerns in contemporary sociology and social theory. Finally, the article seeks to push the 
debate forward by reflecting upon several issues that are not given sufficient attention by Bourdieu 
and Boltanski in their otherwise original and insightful enquiry into the complexities characterizing 
the daily production of ideology. 
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Introduction 
The main purpose of this article is to make a case for the enduring relevance of Pierre 
Bourdieu and Luc Boltanski’s ‘La production de l’idéologie dominante’ [‘The produc- 
tion of the dominant ideology’], which was originally published in Actes de la recherche 
en sciences sociales (henceforth ARSS) in 1976.1 More than three decades later, a re- 
edited version of this study was printed in book format as La production de l’idéologie 
dominante (Paris: Éditions Raisons d’agir, 2008 [1976]).2 This new edition was accom- 
panied by a detailed commentary, written by Luc Boltanski and entitled Rendre la réalité 
inacceptable. À propos de « La production de l’idéologie dominante » [Making Reality 
Unacceptable. Comments on ‘The Production of the Dominant Ideology’] (Paris: 
Demopolis, 2008).3 In this commentary – which contains not only various revealing 
personal anecdotes, but also numerous important sociological insights – Boltanski 
provides an insider account of the genesis of one of the most seminal pieces he co-wrote 
with his intellectual father,  Bourdieu. 
Yet, the theoretical contributions made in La production de l’idéologie dominante 
(henceforth PID) and, to an even greater degree, those made in Rendre la réalité inaccept- 
able (henceforth RRI) have been largely ignored in the Anglophone literature on contem- 
porary French sociology.4 This article aims to fill this gap not only by drawing upon PID 
but also, more significantly, by offering a fine-grained examination of Boltanski’s RRI,5 
demonstrating that these two texts – which constitute forceful reminders of the fact that 
the ‘dominant ideology thesis’6 is far from obsolete – are essential for understanding both 
the personal and the intellectual underpinnings of the tension-laden relationship between 
Bourdieu and Boltanski. In addition, the following sections elucidate the extent to which 
the unexpected, and partly posthumous, reunion between ‘the master’ (Bourdieu) and his 
‘dissident disciple’ (Boltanski)7  equips us with powerful conceptual tools, permitting  us 
not only to illustrate the continuing centrality of ‘ideology critique’ but also, in a more 
fundamental sense, to shed new light on key concerns in contemporary sociology and 
social theory. The final section seeks to push the debate forward by reflecting upon several 
issues that fail to receive sufficient attention by Bourdieu and Boltanski in their otherwise 
original and insightful enquiry into the complexities characterizing the daily production of 
ideology. 
 
1. A Scientific Project 
PID was a scientific project.8 Bourdieu and Boltanski’s conception of science as both an 
inventive and a political endeavour9 was based on the paradoxical assumption that it was 
vital ‘to believe in science and not to believe in it’10, that is, to defend its enlightening 
mission  and,  at  the  same  time,  to  question  its  epistemic  claims  to  objectivity and 
  
 
 
universality. Science is inventive in that it provides conceptual and methodological tools 
for the examination of reality, and it is political in that it can be used either to reinforce 
or to undermine the legitimacy of established ideological, behavioural, and institutional 
patterns. 
Aware of both its innovative and its normative functions, Bourdieu and Boltanski 
insisted on the empowering potential and progressive contributions of science, whilst 
rejecting the positivist faith in the possibility of epistemic objectivity and universaliza- 
bility. Thus the two scholars embraced both a position of scientific optimism, aimed at 
challenging common-sense preconceptions about the world, and a position of scientific 
pessimism, oriented towards exposing the socially specific – that is, value-, power-, and 
interest-laden – functions of all forms of knowledge production. 
Yet, just as it is crucial to draw a functional distinction between the constitutive  tasks 
of science, it is imperative to draw a typological distinction between non-science and 
science. To be exact, we need to recognize the epistemological difference between 
ideology and science: the former is distortive, grounded in misperceptions, misconcep- 
tions, and misrepresentations; the latter is – at least potentially – informative, founded on 
logical descriptions, rational explanations, and methodical evaluations. It is the task 
of scientific analysis to penetrate beyond the deceptive – that is, ideologically filtered – 
appearances of ‘reality’ and to uncover the underlying structural mechanisms that 
govern both the characteristics and the developments of the ‘world’, including those of 
society.11 
 
2. A Non-Conventional Project 
PID was a non-conventional project.12 ARSS, in which PID was originally published, 
sought to bypass the orthodox logic of mainstream academic forums of discussion and 
dissemination, thereby enabling its founding figures to develop a sense of ownership and 
distinct intellectual identity. Those directly involved in the venture ‘found it difficult to 
publish [their] papers in official academic journals, with editorial committees, such as, 
for example […], the Revue française de sociologie’13. The scholars in charge of editing 
these journals tended to regard themselves as ‘gatekeepers of norms […] in the name of 
Science and of what they called Epistemology’14. The nepotistic and protectionist modes 
of functioning of established French academia in the 1970s did not leave much, if any, 
room for alternative ways of undertaking and circulating sociological research. 
In such a counterproductive intellectual climate, for renegades such as Bourdieu   and 
Boltanski, who were unwilling to subscribe to the stifling doxa pervading the aca- demic 
game of middle-of-the-road social science, ‘the idea of having [their]  own jour- nal – a 
place in which [they] could do what [they] wanted to do, write as [they] wished to write, 
develop the areas in which [they] were interested, describe and criticize at the same time, 
in short, do sociology’15 – was both intellectually and strategically attrac- tive. Such an 
endeavour would permit them to set their own agenda, with    independent 
– that is, self-defined and autonomously applied – evaluative parameters, standards,  and 
criteria. 
In this respect, both space and time were significant considerations. To start with, 
‘[t]he question of the length of the papers’16 was important: trying ‘to escape predefined 
  
  
 
formats’17, ARSS provided the opportunity to publish unusually short, as well as extra- 
ordinarily long, articles. Furthermore, the issue of timing was critical: aiming to avoid 
the constraining logic of bureaucratic schedules, ARSS offered a discursive forum in 
which ‘to publish quickly, for instance, a result of a survey […], without having to await 
a committee’s verdict for months’18. 
As any experienced social scientist will be able to confirm, some research-based man- 
uscripts are excellent at 2000 words, others at 8000 words, and others at 15,000 words or 
even longer; and some studies, especially empirical ones, if they do not get published 
until several years after their completion, will seem obsolete by the time they see the light 
of day in the public arena of scholarly discourse. Bourdieu’s book series Le sens commun, 
published by Éditions de Minuit, was motivated by a similar rationale, enabling him and 
his collaborators to create unorthodox realms for the distribution of social- scientific 
findings. United in this mission, the relationship between Bourdieu and Boltanski was 
characterized by a curious ‘mixture of genuine friendship and interest’19, shaped by the 
contradictory – yet fruitful – confluence of collaboration and competition underpinning 
their collective effort to construct alternative spaces for critical reflection capable of 
bypassing the stifling logic of mainstream academic conventions. 
 
3. A Reflexive Project 
PID was a reflexive project.20 Back in the early and mid-1970s, before the arrival of per- 
sonal computer technology,21 most aspects concerning the writing and editing process22 
were dealt with manually. Arguably, this lack of access to advanced IT equipment 
allowed for a more flexible, imaginative, and impromptu modus operandi than is the case 
in the perfectionist writing culture of the digital age.23 Embarking upon the chal- lenging 
task of developing ground-breaking research paradigms and sociological con- cepts, such 
as ‘neutral places’24 and ‘multipositionality’25, Bourdieu and his collaborators aimed to 
make cutting-edge contributions to the social sciences by ‘really breaking with academic 
routines and constraints’26. Immersed in this stimulating atmosphere of both individual 
and collective intellectual ambition, they took advantage of ‘the possibility of working 
with new people, speaking other languages, and moving within new areas, in order to 
discover documents and ideas’27. 
The emerging project of developing a reflexive sociology had two major compo- 
nents, intimately related to Bourdieu’s famous ‘double epistemological rupture’28: the 
break with both scholastic and common-sense conceptions of the world. The former is 
expressed in a categorical commitment to empirical research; the latter is articulated in 
an uncompromising devotion to critical research. The former is epitomized ‘in the pleas- 
ure of sociology, which – dissimilar to established disciplines such as philosophy and 
literary studies – requires not only spending one’s life reading books but also leaving the 
library’29 and looking for inspiration, as well as data, in the ‘real world of occurrences’30. 
The latter is central not only to the interpretive endeavour of calling doxic preconcep- 
tions and taken-for-granted assumptions into question, but also to the explanatory ven- 
ture of shedding light on underlying social forces, notably power structures, whose 
existence largely escapes people’s everyday grasp of the ‘deceptive world of appear- 
ances’31. This uncovering mission – which is essential to Marxist forms of ideology 
  
  
 
critique, including those developed within the intellectual tradition of the Frankfurt 
School – is particularly important to the challenge of examining the mechanisms of social 
domination imposed upon human actors within ‘totally commodified’ and ‘totally 
administered’ societies.32 
 
In a world entirely subordinated to a market logic, in which all relations would be converted 
into contractual transactions […], sociology […] would become simply impossible.33 
 
[…] nowadays, economic power has shifted towards other spheres, often with an international 
character, where the people in charge fail to recognize the value of the social sciences unless 
they are integrated into the culture of management, which represents the new common language 
of the globalized ‘elites’ […].34 
 
A truly reflexive sociology, in the Bourdieusian sense, encourages critical actors to resist 
both the neo-liberalization and the neo-managerialization of society in general and of the 
social sciences in particular. 
 
4. A Work-in-Progress Project 
PID was a work-in-progress project.35 From a distance, the launch of ARSS may be 
viewed as ‘a salient moment in the history of the social sciences in France’36, in the sense 
that it marks the beginning of a new paradigm: ‘a current emerges, it manifests itself in 
its coherence, it invents an original form, it finds a readership, etc.’37. During their period 
of intense collaboration, Boltanski learned important conceptual and theoretical, as well 
as methodological and logistical, lessons from Bourdieu: above all, his mentor’s atten- 
tion to detail, that is, an obsessively meticulous mode of analytical and editorial func- 
tioning that most intellectuals of his calibre inevitably develop. 
At the same time, within this dynamic cooperative and cohesive ‘work-in-progress 
culture’, there was no canonical hierarchy established between different tasks, let alone 
between those in charge of them. This is eloquently expressed in Boltanski’s following 
statement: 
 
One of the numerous things that I learned from the patron [Bourdieu] – especially whilst 
working with him on the journal, maybe one of the most important ones – was the attention to 
detail, which goes hand in hand with the refusal to establish a hierarchy between tasks, as if 
some of them were significant and sophisticated and others largely irrelevant and unpleasant. 
There was no ‘school management’ [intendance] in our group. We were the management 
ourselves, with this obsessive wish to control and reflect on everything […].38 
 
Perhaps it was the eclectic constitution of the group of scholars editing the journal that 
was the main reason behind the prolific research culture it produced among its members. 
It was shaped by ‘a multitude of interactions, taking place within rather different registers 
– economic, amicable, intellectual, strategic, material, etc.’39 and creating ‘connections 
between different people’40, most of whom – in line with the stereotype of ‘academic 
egos’ – were ‘sensitive, difficult’41, and each of whom had their own ‘writing style’42 and 
their own ‘obsessions’43. 
  
  
 
Owing to this heterogeneous – and, in many ways, tension-laden – composition of the 
team, the preparation of each collection of articles required ‘compatibilizing persons and 
things whose association could never be taken for granted’44. Under such circumstances, 
‘this collective work was demanding’45, not only because of internal discrepancies but 
also due to a considerable lack of human, material, and logistical resources.46 Given that 
2000 copies of the first number of ARSS were sold out within only two weeks of its pub- 
lication47, however, the members of the group realized that their ‘work-in-progress pro- 
ject’ had swiftly turned into a serious academic venture with a potentially large-scale 
– that is, interdisciplinary and international – impact. 
 
5. An Autonomist Project 
PID was an autonomist project, that is, a collective undertaking situated outside the insti- 
tutional mainstream of academia.48 Far from (re-)telling the story of the emergence of 
ARSS for reasons of nostalgia or academic narcissism,49 Boltanski – in his RRI – wishes 
to illustrate the contingency of the social conditions that undergird the production of 
knowledge, particularly in terms of the decisive influence of epistemic networks. For him, 
the challenge is ‘to uncover the arbitrary nature of the constraints that are presented and 
often accepted, nowadays, as inevitable and unstoppable’50.The question that arises in this 
context, however, is the following: if this sort of autonomist research ‘was possible thirty 
years ago, why is it not possible, in a different form, today?’51 Boltanski’s response to this 
query is straightforward: as a result of the arrival of neo-liberalism and neo-managerial- 
ism, new ‘modes of control and administration’52 have emerged in recent decades. Whilst 
in the 1970s ‘[t]he techniques of modern management had not yet penetrated the aca- 
demic and cultural worlds’53, in the present era large parts of educational and intellectual 
life are colonized by systemic imperatives, especially by those imposed by the economy 
and the state through processes of commodification and bureaucratization.54 
As Boltanski cynically remarks, in the marketized and managerialized world of 
contemporary academia, the idea of publishing – largely or exclusively – in non-refereed 
journals is tantamount to professional suicide.55 By contrast, at the time of the foundation 
of ARSS, Bourdieu’s and his collaborators’ ability to escape the intellectually stifling – if 
not, paralysing – rhythm of a standardized ‘nine-to-five’ working day, aimed at meeting 
instrumentally driven targets in accordance with numerically defined benchmarks, was 
conducive to the emergence of a prolific research environment, shaped by the meaning- 
ful – that is, purposive, cooperative, and creative – activities of its participants. 
 
[…] this slackness, this administrative carelessness, was precisely what opened a space of 
liberty in which creation became possible. Within the margins, the marginalized were at ease.56 
 
Of course, principles of the academic market existed, and one could know them. If one was 
prepared to pay a certain price, however, it was more or less possible to ignore them. They were 
not constantly on our minds. And this gave us courage. There were multiple markets, rather 
than one big market. And, between the interstices of these markets, there were zones in which 
not many things worked, but in which we, on condition that we did not have too high an 
expectation, were more or less protected.57 
  
  
 
In short, the founding figures of ARSS had succeeded in giving birth to a space of relative 
autonomy, capable of challenging not only the constraints of conventional academia but 
also, more fundamentally, the imperatives of a market- and target-driven society. 
 
6. A Counter-Hegemonic Project 
PID was a counter-hegemonic project.58 To be sure, throughout his academic career, 
Boltanski has co-authored various studies59, notably with Laurent Thévenot60, Ève 
Chiapello61, Élisabeth Claverie62, and – perhaps, most significantly – with Pierre 
Bourdieu63, but also with other scholars64, in addition to having given quite a few inter- 
views, which were eventually published65. Unlike most of his other co-authored texts, 
however, the writing projects on which Boltanski collaborated with ‘the patron’ – in 
particular that of PID – were developed during long nights filled with seemingly endless 
work, either at his mentor’s house, in Antony, or at his mentor’s office, situated in the 
Maison des sciences de l’homme.66 As explicitly acknowledged by Boltanski, Bourdieu 
took the lead in preparing most sections of this seminal text67, which – initially – was 
supposed to be part of an edited volume on the origins and consequences of May 1968, 
which never saw the light of day.68 
One of the striking features of Bourdieu’s research group was its tripartite function as 
an intellectual circle, a family enterprise, and a forum for political activists.69 In other 
words, it appeared to be a major source of scholarly creativity, social solidarity, and 
grassroots normativity. Within this atmosphere of intense imaginative, collaborative, and 
projective self-realization, the purpose of PID was to scrutinize ‘the social philosophy of 
the “dominant fraction of the dominant class”’70. Paradoxically, it was the eclectic nature 
of the empirical material gathered for this enquiry – such as ‘extracts from works, cursory 
comments on exam scripts, statistics, biographical notes, diagrams, televised interviews, 
etc.’71 – which was aimed at ‘demonstrating the coherence of a conception of the social 
world’72. The question remains, then, what exactly Bourdieu and Boltanski had in mind 
when making use of the term ‘ideology’. In this respect, the following pas- sage is 
revealing: 
 
The concept of ideology, as it is understood in this work, is derived from the ethnography of 
forms of classification and categorization, as well as of systems of thought that inform mythical 
and ritual practices. One of the ideas underlying the text is that it is precisely because it     [i.e. 
ideology] is contained within largely implicit schemes, capable of triggering an infinity of 
discursive productions and practices adjusted to different situations, that this worldview can, at 
the same time, draw upon truisms based on common sense, as if it did not serve any function 
apart from saying what goes without saying, and perform an efficient action oriented towards 
the transformation of the social world in a particular way. […] In this sense, one could conceive 
of ideology as an extension of Austian performativity […].73 
 
On this account, ideology and, in parallel, ideology critique, possess several socio- 
ontological functions: (a) classifying/declassifying, (b)  mythologizing/demythologizing, 
(c) ritualizing/deritualizing, (d) naturalizing/denaturalizing, (e) concealing/uncovering, 
(f) mobilizing/demobilizing, and (g) normalizing/denormalizing. Intrinsically  ambivalent, 
  
  
 
all of these functions are relevant to two diametrically opposed processes: rein- 
forcing or cha llenging, confirming or undermining, conforming or subver ting, 
stabilizing or disrupting, strengthening or weakening, conserving or transforming the 
status quo.74 
In Marxian terms, every ideology constitutes a symbolically mediated ‘superstruc- 
tural reflection’ of a materially consolidated ‘infrastructural reality’. In Wittgensteinian 
terms, every ideology is tantamount to a grammatically organized ‘language game’ 
embedded in a socio-historically specific ‘life form’. In Bourdieusian terms, every ideol- 
ogy represents an interest-laden ‘doxa’ situated in a power-laden ‘field’. Irrespective of 
the particular definition that one may favour, every ideology can be characterized as a 
structured and structuring structure: as a structured structure, it is shaped by social inter- 
actions and by the ways in which its advocates attribute meaning to the world; as a struc- 
turing structure, it shapes social interactions, including its defenders’ interpretations of 
the world. 
What is – both theoretically and practically – more significant, however, is that it is 
the task of ideology critique (Ideologiekritik) to facilitate ‘a movement of deconstruction 
[…], a critical reappropriation of the social world’75,with the aim of empowering ‘those 
who suffer from the oppression of reality as it is, that is, as it is constructed by those who, 
in accordance with their interests, dominate it’76. In brief, the attempt to deconstruct the 
production of the dominant ideology is inextricably linked to the challenge of creat- ing 
counter-hegemonic imaginaries, capable of challenging both the epistemic validity and 
the social legitimacy of established orthodoxies and thereby contributing to the con- 
struction of emancipatory realities. 
 
7. A Relationalist Project 
PID was a relationalist project,77 that is, a critical endeavour aiming to unearth the rela- 
tional constitution of reality, shaped by dynamics of positioning and, hence, by struggles 
over access to material and symbolic resources available in a given society. With this 
relationalist presupposition in mind, it is the job of critical sociologists to examine the 
performative construction of the multiple places that human actors occupy within the 
social space. In this respect, the following epistemo-methodological remark is crucial: 
 
The place between ‘dominant ideology’ and ‘dominant class’ is examined in terms of the 
intermediary concept of neutral place, which lies at the heart of the text.78 
 
Paradoxically, Bourdieu and Boltanski’s account of ideology stands within the Marxist 
tradition of social and political analysis, whilst seeking to go beyond it: although there is, 
inevitably, an intimate link between dominant ideologies and dominant classes, the for- 
mer cannot be reduced to an epiphenomenal manifestation of the latter. Thus, rather than 
subscribing to the orthodox Marxist assumption that ‘[t]he ideas of the ruling class are in 
every epoch the ruling ideas’79, that is, that ‘the class which is the ruling material force 
of society is at the same time its ruling intellectual force’80, the two French sociologists 
introduce the concept of neutral place, in order to suggest that the construction of sym- 
bolic forms – despite the fact that this process is subject to spatiotemporally  contingent 
  
  
 
conditions of production – enjoys a degree of relative autonomy, whose complexity is 
functionally related, but not reducible, to the class-specific workings of a given society. 
 
An ideology, understood from the perspective of social anthropology, can be characterized as 
‘dominant’ to the extent that the schemes supporting it inspire the discourses and practices of 
the members of a society, without therefore being attributed to a ‘dominant class’.81 
 
Put differently, ideology – in the broad, anthropological sense – is neither class-driven 
nor classless; rather, it is both class-immanent and class-transcendent, that is, it is shaped 
by socio-economic power, whilst rising above its stratifying logic. Surely, class-divided 
societies generate class-specific ideologies. Yet, the sociological centrality of socio- 
economically defined stratification patterns does not eliminate the existence of   diverse 
– notably, cultural, ethnic, philosophical, scientific, religious, or artistic – sets of prin- 
ciples and values, which are irreducible to mere vehicles of symbolic forms representing 
the interests of a particular social class. 
In the 1970s, ‘the existence of social classes was still widely recognized, not only   by 
sociologists, but also by political and administrative actors and, more generally, by the 
majority of ordinary people’82. To be clear, Boltanski does not posit that, from the late 20th 
century onwards, we have been witnessing the arrival of a ‘classless era’83. He implies, 
however, that the analysis provided in PID is more relevant than ever in the face of at least 
three key characteristics of advanced liberal-capitalist societies: heterogeneity, 
intersectionality, and subjectlessness. 
 
(a) With regard to the issue of heterogeneity, the notion of the fractions of class84 is 
vital to the attempt to do justice to the fact that classes are internally divided by 
values, resources, and interests. 
(b) With regard to the issue of intersectionality, the notion of the relativity of class85 
is essential to the insight that human behaviour is shaped not only by socio- 
economic resources but also, simultaneously, by numerous other sociological 
variables – such as ethnicity, gender, age, and ability –, each of which possesses 
an idiosyncratic logic of functioning and none of which is reducible to any other 
co-variable. 
(c) With regard to the issue of subjectlessness, the notion of the non-intentionality of 
class is fundamental to rejecting any kind of conspiracy theory by recognizing 
that the most homogenous social group cannot be reduced to a unified collective 
subject with a monolithic base and cohesive will power. 
 
It is in the light of these three reservations, concerning reductive conceptions of class, 
that the notion of ‘neutral place’ plays a pivotal role in PID: 
 
The concept of neutral place permits us to account for these places without having to advocate a 
conspiracy theory. Neutral places are more or less instituted spaces within which the members 
of different fractions can meet and have exchanges without having to abandon their 
characteristics […].86 
  
  
 
One of the key objectives of PID, in this respect, is the idea of challenging various 
apocalyptic announcements – such as ‘the end of class’, ‘the end of politics’, ‘the end of 
history’, and – last but not least – ‘the end of ideology’.87 The provocative claim that, in 
the late 20th century, relatively affluent societies have experienced the gradual ‘end of 
ideologies’88 – combined with ‘the subsequent disappearance of social classes’89 and ‘the 
end of history’90, epitomized in ‘the collapse of the USSR’91 – seems to have been 
confirmed by tendencies towards ‘depoliticization’92, denoting a theme that, nowadays, 
plays an ‘eminent role in the nostalgic regrets of the reformist Left’93. If there is one 
grand narrative that has outlived the postmodern announcement regarding the ‘end of 
metanarratives’94, it is individualism. 
 
[Contemporary] ‘society’, with its ‘individualism’ especially ‘among young people’, [is] the 
result of a politics entirely oriented towards the end of politics, understood as the bringing- 
into-line of critical movements that attempted to oppose the dominant  ideology.95 
 
On this view, ‘the rise of individualism’96 – which, arguably, constitutes ‘the last grand 
narrative’97 – is ‘the result of the work of fragmentation, which has accompanied the 
depoliticization of social life’98. It appears, then, that – with the exception of liberalism – 
the grand political ideologies of the 19th and 20th centuries – particularly anarchism, 
communism/socialism, conservatism, and fascism – are ‘no longer necessary’99 and, in 
fact, almost completely outdated, because they are out of touch with reality. What is left 
is a social universe governed by ‘the meritocratic ideal’100 that ‘if one wants, one can’101. 
Presumably, such a world is shaped by ‘the equality of chances, that is, by meritocratic 
measures allowing for the fair selection of individuals, in terms of their efforts and their 
work and, consequently, in accordance with their merits and their personal talents’102. 
Unsurprisingly, the project of eugenics was central to the attempt – made by modernist 
elites, mainly between the 1850s and the 1950s – to radicalize the ideology of meritoc- 
racy in a Darwinian fashion, based on the idea that the evolutionary principle of ‘the 
survival of the fittest’ could be mobilized in the interest of humanity, rather than exclu- 
sively in the interest of a particular social group or class.103 
The paradigmatic shift from Keynesianism and Fordism, founded on ‘the develop- 
ment of the – integrated and more or less planned – large-scale industry’104, to neo- 
liberalism and post-Fordism, expressed in ‘the prioritization of mobility, openness […] 
and transformations’105, involves a historical transition from relatively regulated   to 
increasingly deregulated forms of capitalism. This ‘(neo-)liberal turn’106 is ideologi- 
cally motivated by ‘the critique of “corporatism” (understood as syndicalism), of the 
“blocked society” (understood as the state’s steering of the productive apparatus and of 
social policies)’107. 
In this context, Boltanski’s distinction between two fundamental types of critique is 
relevant: 
  The historical impact of social critique – directed at pathological consequences of 
the rise of modernity, such as misery, inequality, and egoism – is reflected in the 
idea of a ‘grand contractual politics’108, associated with the influence of the 
working class movement in general and of the Trade Unions in particular. 
  
  
  The historical impact of artistic critique – exposing the alienating effects of the 
emergence of modernity, such as inauthenticity and oppression – manifests 
itself in ‘the development of the “autonomy” of people at work and of their 
“responsibiliza tion”’109. 
 
The paradigm of social critique is intimately related to what Boltanski characterizes as 
the second spirit of capitalism. This ‘second spirit’ is ‘centred on the big enterprise, gov- 
erned by wage-earning directors, some of whom come from the Grands corps de   l’État, 
on Taylorian modes of production, and on public policies of planning and the 
redistribution of wealth’110. The ‘invisible hand’ of the market was supposed to be con- 
trolled by the ‘visible hand’ of the state.111 
The paradigm of artistic critique is firmly embedded in what Boltanski refers to as 
the new spirit of capitalism112. This ‘third spirit’ is based on ‘the consolidation of new 
forms of production (network production, the development of subcontracting, externali- 
zation, increase in so-called “atypical” contracts of employment and in the number of 
workers in precarious situations)’113. These societal tendencies are inextricably linked to 
individual and collective experiences of ‘the uncertainties of the market’114 and, more 
fundamentally, to ‘the establishment of a new type of relation between capitalism and the 
state’115, driven by processes of privatization, deregulation, decentralization, debureauc- 
ratization, and flexibilization.116 
 
 
8. A Constructivist Project 
PID was a constructivist project.117 Rejecting any kind of essentialist determinism, 
according to which the division between ‘strong’ and ‘weak’ members in society may be 
‘naturally’ or ‘biologically’ determined, PID makes a case for social constructivism, 
according to which patterns of stratification, since they are relationally contingent, are 
fairly arbitrary. 
 
[…] the elites have always sought to justify their positions and their privileges, by insisting on 
the natural character – linked not only to human nature (which sounds a bit old-fashioned), but 
especially to human nature rooted in a biological substrate (which makes knowledge accessible 
to science and, thus, justifiable as supposedly inevitable) – of hierarchy and inequalities, portrayed 
as the mechanical product of differences in terms of skills, capacities, and talents.118 
 
In its most extreme forms, such an essentialist-determinist understanding of society is 
combined with the Darwinian, or even eugenicist, presupposition that the progress of 
humanity is driven by the ineluctable selection process of ‘the survival of the fittest’. 
According to this account, it is because of, not despite, the constitutive societal – and, 
arguably, evolutionary – role of powerful actors that history moves forward. The conten- 
tion that ‘it is evident that the world evolves thanks to its elites’119 goes hand in hand with 
the assumption that left-wing ‘egalitarianism’120 leads to stifling ‘conformism’121, which 
obstructs the flourishing of ‘the most creative and most original forms of the human 
spirit’122, but which is advocated by those who are infused with resentment when realizing 
that ‘they cannot follow’123. 
  
  
 
The worldview described above is based on a combination of problematic ‘-isms’: 
 
(a) essentialism, because it presupposes that different human beings are marked by 
different unchangeable – that is, deeply ingrained – traits and characteristics; 
(b) determinism, because it suggests that both individual and societal developments 
are governed by these traits and characteristics; 
(c) socio-biologism, because it implies that the traits and characteristics determining 
human behaviour are both culturally and naturally constituted; 
(d) historicism, because it posits that the distribution of these traits and characteris- 
tics is of world-historical significance, shaping the development of the human 
species; 
(e) evolutionism, because it maintains that world-historical developments are 
embedded in an underlying storyline driven by   progress; 
(f) teleologism, because it assumes that the totality of worldly occurrences, including 
human actions, is oriented towards the realization of an overarching goal and that 
history – literally – ‘makes sense’ in that it follows a predetermined direction; 
(g) elitism, because it endorses the view that individuals forming part of a selective 
group with distinct qualities are intellectually and culturally – that is, civilization- 
ally – superior to those who are not part of it; and 
(h) eugenicism, because it subscribes to the belief that the genetic quality of the 
human world population is constantly improving, thereby ensuring that – in the 
long run – only those with desired qualities succeed in contributing positively to 
the reproduction of the species, whilst those with undesired traits are relegated to 
the fringes of society and will gradually disappear. 
 
The positivist conviction that both human and non-human forms of existence are gov- 
erned by underlying laws – which can be uncovered by virtue of logical, rational, and 
empirical enquiry – has been central to the development of the natural and social sciences, 
especially in the 19th and early 20th centuries.124 According to this view, ‘economic, 
historical, and social nature dictates its laws’125, enforcing them upon the development 
of humanity, as much as physical, biological, and chemical constellations impose their 
causal patterns and regularities upon all aspects of worldly reality. Applied to the inter- 
pretation of human inequalities, the positivist method can be employed in the attempt to 
attribute scientific validity to the belief in the existence of evolutionary selection pro- 
cesses, which – presumably – permeate the development of society. This creed, which 
lies at the heart of the bourgeois doxa of ‘entitlement’, has proved vital to the reproduc- 
tion of dominant ideologies and, thus, to justifying both the material and the symbolic 
influence of self-legitimizing hegemonies. 
 
Thus, the dominant ideology is, above all, what is transmitted in the places and, particularly, in 
the educational institutions of the elite, to which the dominant classes wish to send their 
children, so that they can acquire the (good) education and the (good) spiritual journey that will 
permit them, eventually, to play the role they are expected to play, to join the elites, and become 
intelligent bosses.126 
  
  
 
In other words, it is by virtue of their ‘class-doxa’ and their ‘class-habitus’, reproduced 
in ‘class-fields’, that the dominant groups in society manage to perpetuate the stratifying 
logic underlying their own destiny, as well as the fate of those who are excluded from the 
privileged sectors of vertically organized realities. ‘The dominant ideology, the dominant 
culture within the circles of power, these are, in essence, the ideology and the culture 
shaped and transmitted’127 in and through ‘the neutral spaces’128, which – as relationally 
constructed fields of distinguished interaction – provide precious opportunities for the 
most privileged members of society, thereby enabling them to accomplish the mission of 
their self-fulfilling prophecy. 
 
9. A Critical Project 
PID was a critical project.129 In the contemporary era, one of the main problems faced 
by advocates of radical emancipatory practices is that critique can be confiscated by 
dominant ideologies in order to reinforce the legitimacy of class-divided societies.    The 
dominant classes – ‘drawing upon the shared values of equality, equity, and 
transparency’130 – have succeeded in (re-)appropriating seemingly progressive principles 
for their own purposes.131 Cracking the secret of dominant ideologies, social critique can 
serve multiple functions132, such as the following: 
  It can challenge different forms of ideological organization, that is, of specific sets 
of taken-for-granted assumptions based on ‘doxa’133 and on the seemingly ‘most 
indisputable and most easily shared common values’134, which appear to possess 
‘a quasi-sacred character’135.  It can challenge different forms of political organization, recognizing that liberal 
and media-centred democracies, although they are embedded in systems of social 
domination, are preferable to authoritarian regimes and dictatorships.136  It can challenge different forms of economic organization, notably capitalism. 
The transition from the ‘second’ to the ‘third’ spirit of capitalism is reflected in 
‘the shift from a representation of society in terms of social classes, or at least 
socio-professional categories, to a representation in terms of social success, with 
the sliding from “workers” to “the poor” (the “new poor”) and, hence, to “the 
excluded”’137.  It can challenge different forms of technological organization, calling into  ques- 
tion the naïve subscription of elites to the belief in the universally empowering 
force of ‘technical progress and the industrial  greatness’138.  It  can challenge different forms of  academic organization, especially    those 
dictated by the neo-liberalization and neo-managerialization of education and 
research. 
 
It is this final point to which Boltanski, in the context of PID, attributes great importance. 
In the 1970s, the possibility of  participating  in  a  group  of  sociological  scholars and 
investigators allowed for the enriching ‘experience of collective research’139. By 
  
  
 
contrast, ‘nowadays, it is common to end up in solitude’140 and isolation when trying to 
embark upon an academic career. What has emerged in recent decades – applying to 
higher education and scholarly investigation in most Western societies – is ‘a mixed and 
strongly hierarchical space, composed of a set of academic institutions (among which the 
possibilities for the pursuit of research are very unevenly distributed)’141. In such a verti- 
cally organized, competitive, and target-driven environment, in which the allocation of 
material and symbolic resources is profoundly unequal, ‘the ambition and the freedom of 
research’142 suffer from the colonization of meaningful – that is, purposive, cooperative, 
and creative – activities by systemic imperatives. Under these circumstances, scientific 
enquiry is exposed to the ubiquitous influence of a state and an economy that function in 
accordance with the disempowering logic of instrumental rationality. 
Increasingly common, then, is ‘[t]he experience of both insecurity – with the anxiety 
it provokes, not only in material but also, especially, in identity-related terms – and  
intense competition between applicants, accompanying this process of tests’143, trials, 
and constant assessments.144 Most contemporary researchers have – albeit, admittedly, to 
different degrees – ‘interiorized the institutional demands to which they are subject’145, 
reproducing them and, to a large extent, taking them for granted, in order to be able to 
survive within an increasingly commodified and benchmark-oriented academic field. 
 
It is, therefore, more and more difficult to find niches (in the sense of ‘ecological niches’) 
favourable to the emergence of nonconformist works. The alternative that presents itself most 
frequently is the one of belonging at the cost of conformity or the one of anti-conformism, but 
at the cost of marginality, which also means without resources for research.146 
 
Put differently, in the contemporary academic field, one has two options: either one is 
willing to play the game of position-taking, benchmarking, and competition over mate- 
rial and symbolic resources; or one refuses to follow the market-, target-, and impact- 
driven logic of neo-liberal education and research agendas. The price one has to pay for 
the first scenario is succumbing to compliance and conformity, involving a considerable 
loss of scholarly autonomy and intellectual integrity. The price one has to pay for the 
second scenario is the risk of self-relegation and marginalization, leading to a substantial 
deficit of room for effective agency within academic institutions, thereby undermining 
both the short-term and the long-term viability of one’s career as an investigator, whose 
professional performance depends largely on the ability to secure access to numerous 
sources of funding. 
One of the essential ingredients of Bourdieu and Boltanski’s success story was to 
establish themselves as scholars who were sufficiently integrated into the academic 
system to benefit from its material and symbolic resources, whilst being sufficiently 
marginalized within the scientific community to develop their own agenda on the basis 
of a nonconformist sense of collective identity. For them, to be part of a ‘critical move- 
ment’147 meant to ‘embrace the social sciences’148 by bypassing ‘the bureaucratic and 
political control of the cultural institutions depending on the state’149. Indeed, their 
theoretical and practical capacity to transcend the instrumental logic of the market and 
the state provided them with a sense of  accomplishment: 
  
  
 
[…] the confidence that we had in ourselves, not as individuals but as a collective […], [was] a 
victory […] [for] critical thinking […], a political victory […]; our critical work within correct 
conditions was already a victory – and like a victory of the social sciences.150 
 
In this light, social science constitutes a collective endeavour concerned with three 
essential critical tasks: (a) uncovering, (b) distancing, and (c) historicizing. 
 
(a) It aims to uncover the multiple underlying forces by which ideological, behav- 
ioural, and institutional patterns are shaped or, in some cases, even determined – 
particularly those that involve mechanisms of asymmetrically distributed access 
to different forms of power.151 
(b) It aims to distance itself from its object of study, since even the most ‘immersive’ 
methodological approaches – such as ethnomethodology – require at least a mini- 
mal degree of epistemic exteriority: ‘no phenomenon can be described if one 
remains entirely inside the framework that sustains it’152. 
(c) It aims to historicize social reality by shedding light on the spatiotemporally con- 
tingent conditions underlying its quotidian construction. In Boltanski’s terms, ‘to 
write a history of the present […] is the task of sociology’153. It is from this con- 
textualizing attitude that sociology derives its principal normative mission: to 
question the givenness of empirical immanence by daring to think in terms of the 
beyondness of imaginative transcendence. Sociology, therefore, involves the 
challenge of confronting ‘the possibility that the present may be something that 
it is not, that reality may be something that it is not and, consequently, of relativ- 
izing or deconstructing the present as it is’154. The main assumption underpinning 
socio-historical constructivism can be summarized as follows: what can be con- 
structed can be deconstructed and, if necessary, reconstructed. The constant con- 
fluence of construction, deconstruction, and reconstruction processes is as central 
to the pursuit of sociology as it is to the daily production of society.155 
 
If ‘sociology is critical by vocation’,156 then it needs to take issue with the misrepresenta- 
tions of reality that are produced by dominant ideologies, which are designed to conceal 
the material and symbolic divisions within vertically structured societies. 
 
10. An Emancipatory Project 
PID was an emancipatory project.157 As spelled out by Boltanski, the article was well 
received by many other scholars, especially by those who felt sympathetic towards 
Bourdieu’s research group: sociologists158, linguists159, historians160, philosophers161, 
Hellenists162, anthropologists163, sinologists164, economists165, artists166, writers167, and 
colleagues working for cultural centres and museums168. This extensive interest in PID 
was a reflection of its interdisciplinary relevance to key debates across a wide spectrum 
in the humanities and social sciences.169 
Strongly influenced by the ‘counter-culture of 1968’170, PID was a systematic attempt 
to challenge the hegemonic ideological, behavioural, and institutional codes generated 
by managerial elites ‘within the economic space’171, in which there was little room   for 
  
  
 
the negotiating power of trade unions. The defence of counter-hegemonic principles, 
practices, and life forms indicates ‘the possible recuperation of the positive aspects      of 
social crisis, within the cultural world’172, that is, of ‘emancipatory dimensions’173. 
Critical sociology, in the radical sense, may be conceived of as an oppositional force 
questioning the legitimacy of systems of domination.174 In fact, one of the themes of PID 
‘consists in opposing the conciliatory representations of liberal modernity on  the basis 
of a genealogy’175 capable of exposing the disempowering and pathological 
consequences of the spread of dominant ideologies. 
 
11. An Undogmatic Project 
PID was an undogmatic project.176 Granted, ‘various themes that lie at the heart of con- 
temporary social struggles are missing’177 in this study. This is especially true in relation 
to issues concerning the problem of intersectionality, that is, the ways in which key 
sociological variables – such as class, ethnicity, gender, age, and ability – simultaneously 
structure ideological, behavioural, and institutional patterns.178 Among the main rea- 
sons for this omission are, as pointed out by Boltanski, the following: (a) the widespread 
machismo, which permeated not only large parts of the working classes, but also aca- 
demic circles179; (b) the predominance of class-focused analysis in left-wing social and 
political thought180; (c) the absence of adequate conceptual approaches capable of shed- 
ding light on the existence, let alone the complexity, of intersectional dynamics and 
mechanisms181. 
The third point appears to be particularly important in this regard: ‘in the middle of 
the 1970s, [they] were not equipped with an analytical framework permitting [them] to 
interconnect different struggles182. Of course, in hindsight, it is easy to take issue with 
this lack of investigative openness and conceptual imagination. Given the impact of the 
politics of identity, difference, and recognition183 upon contemporary understandings of 
social change, however, it is difficult to conceive of critical approaches to relations of 
power and domination without facing up to the multi-layered constitution of interrelated 
and overlapping sociological variables shaping people’s positions in diverse – coexisting 
and, in many cases, interpenetrating – realms of interaction.184  Thus it is imperative     to 
account for ‘the existence of a multiplicity of belongings’185 and ‘identity-based 
relations’186, as reflected in the rise of a politics ‘demanding the recognition of specific 
modes of oppression’187 and, hence, insisting on the plurality, heterogeneity, irreduc- 
ibility, and incommensurability of contemporary social conflicts. Rather than bemoaning 
‘the decline of the working class movement’188, critical sociologists need to ‘take seri- 
ously the large number of emerging demands and struggles’189, thereby acknowledging 
the manifold belongings and allegiances190 that are not only constructed and recon- 
structed but also experienced by ‘the plural actor’191. 
Undoubtedly, it remains crucial to conceive of Ideologiekritik as a form of 
Sozialkritik,192 that is, as a systematic questioning of discursive frameworks that, due to 
their distortive function, conceal the domination and ‘exploitation of human beings’193 
by specific interactional and structural forces. Indispensable to this reflexive endeavour 
is the transcendence of the binary distinction between ‘the “multitude” and the “mass” 
[…] (submissive, passive, gregarious, easily abused by the demagogues, […] etc.)’194, on 
  
  
 
the one hand, and ‘the elite subjects, bestowed with a genuine interiority, with a Kantian 
autonomy and lucid consciousness’,195 on the other. The power of social distinction 
remains distinctly powerful. It is the task of ideology critique to deconstruct it.196 
 
12. A Materialist Project 
PID was a materialist project.197 As such, its protagonists were determined to insist on the 
continuing centrality of class in advanced societies. Indeed, class has been back on the 
social and political agenda for several decades. It survived the ‘cultural turn’198 in sociol- 
ogy, and – owing to the pivotal role it plays in the stratification of capitalist societies – it 
will outlive other paradigmatic shifts in the future. Contrary to the fashionable rhetoric 
about the alleged ‘end of class’ in the context of post-industrialism and, thus, in opposition 
to the assumption that society is, increasingly, ‘oriented towards a classless structure’199, 
one of the key objectives of PID was to insist on the continuing relevance of socio-eco- 
nomic divisions, expressed in both material and symbolic stratification patterns, in 
advanced capitalist formations.200 In a Marxist-functionalist fashion, one may claim that 
the state – as a vital institutional component of the superstructure in class-divided societies 
– has always been, and will always continue to be, ‘the mediator of class struggle’201. 
Certainly, it is possible to conceptualize the separation between social classes in a 
large variety of ways. Notwithstanding the particular explanatory model to which one 
may  subscribe,  it  is  difficult  to  deny  that  stratified  societies  are  characterized  by 
– often highly complex – divisions between ‘superior’ and ‘inferior’ classes.202 The 
normatively more significant issue, however, is that those ‘at the bottom’ tend to be 
more aware of their class position than those ‘at the top’.203 Put in more general terms, 
‘dominated’ subjects tend to be more conscious of their position in the social space than 
their ‘dominant’ counterparts – regardless of whether their possibilities for action are 
defined primarily in terms of class, ethnicity, gender, age, or ability. The Hegelian 
distinction between ‘a subject in itself’ and ‘a subject for itself’204 is crucial to each of 
these dimensions: actors’ awareness of their position in the social space is a precondition 
for their ability to transform it. 
Arguably, different ‘spirits of capitalism’ are accompanied by different ‘spirits of 
class’. Under the influence of the second spirit, from the 1930s onwards, class was taken 
seriously by the state, as demonstrated in the rise of different welfare state regimes – 
notably the social-democratic, corporatist, and liberal ones.205 Under the impact of the 
third spirit, from the 1980s onwards, class became less central to the state, as illustrated 
in the increasing influence of neo-liberal and neo-managerial ideologies, coupled with 
the project of meritocracy, driven by the ambition ‘to guarantee the establishment of a 
social order […] within which all positions will be equally accessible to everyone (the 
equality of chances), in accordance with a model of an open market’206. 
There are, as noted by Boltanski, various interrelated reasons for the revival of class 
in recent years: first, the fading trust in the state’s capacity to pursue viable class politics; 
second, an increasing interest in a more differentiated understanding of class; and, third, 
the need to acknowledge the – aforementioned – pivotal role of intersectionality, oblig- 
ing us to reflect on, and engage with, ‘new factors underlying inequality and new forms 
of exploitation’207. In the jungle world of multiple – interconnected and, in some respects, 
  
  
 
competing – struggles, social actors have to learn ‘to envisage their own condition and 
their identity under different relations and, consequently, to participate in different forms 
of mobilization’208, as well as to cope with ‘the tensions or the contradictions between 
these different dimensions’209. If, however, even the most disempowered and exploited 
actors living on the fringes of society stop identifying with class210, then it is time to 
rethink the role of the diverse motivational backgrounds triggering individual and collec- 
tive struggles in the contemporary era. 
 
13. A Historicist Project 
PID was a historicist project.211 Irrespective of what one wishes to make of recent 
announcements   concerning   numerous   purportedly   ground-breaking  developments 
– above all, with regard to ‘class’, ‘ideology’, ‘politics’, and ‘history’212 –, one paradig- 
matic transition appears to have been crucial: 
 
[…] the shift from a regime of the legitimization of authority that is, in principle, founded on 
the collective or popular will to a regime that is, in fact, based on the social sciences – 
particularly, on economics, demography, political science, and sociology; together with the 
subscription to the idea of the end of history, that is, of politics, which has been replaced with a 
managerial representation of power transposed by the enterprise state, which is itself committed 
to redefining the relations between capitalism and the state […].213 
 
Unsurprisingly, ‘critique has had to adjust itself’214 to the new parameters underlying 
contemporary societal formations. The historical transition from simple domination, 
epitomized in authoritarian regimes, to complex domination, sustaining capita list- 
democratic regimes, is crucial in this respect.215 The ‘two great totalitarianisms’ of the 
20th century – namely state socialism and fascism216 – seem to have given way to the 
triumph of political and economic liberalism and, hence, to the victorious consolida- tion 
of ‘market democracy’217 in large parts of the world. PID was ahead of its time in 
anticipating this socio-historical shift, especially in terms of capitalism’s capacity to 
convert both critique and reform – and, consequently, change – into vital ingredients   of 
the recipe of its own  success. 
 
This mode of domination, which is guided by the imperative ‘change in order to preserve’, is 
conceived of in PID as a ‘progressive (or converted) conservatism’ in contrast to ‘avowed 
conservatism’.218 
+ 
This paradigmatic turn is intimately interrelated with ‘the shift from Fordist manage- 
ment, associated with the second spirit of capitalism, to the “network” management, 
associated with the new “spirit”’219. This novel societal constellation manifests itself in 
the emergence of new ‘tests’ in the labour market: 
 
The new selection tests have been invoked, within a multitude of quotidian local, and each time 
unique, situations, thereby profoundly modifying people’s future […].220 
 
Paradoxically, the elites pressing for this kind of change in managerial culture are   both 
conservative and progressive: they are conservative, in the sense that they tend   to 
  
  
 
promote orthodox values legitimizing their relatively powerful position in society; at the 
same time, they are progressive, in the sense that they tend to endorse heterodox princi- 
ples aimed at converting change into the main currency of long-term material and ideo- 
logical success. 
 
The principal feature of the ‘elites’ whose texts and interventions are analysed in our article 
[…] [is] the advocacy of ‘change’. These elites regard themselves as radically cutting-edge and 
modernist. […] the ‘fatality of the probable’ […]: one has to want the change that announces 
itself because change is inevitable. Thus, one has to want necessity.221 
 
The ideological celebration of the doxa ‘change in order to preserve’222 plays a pivotal 
role in advanced knowledge economies, in which ‘governance by “experts”’223 consti- 
tutes an integral element of a mode of domination whose secret lies in the orientation 
towards the future, rather than in the short-sighted concern with the present, let alone in 
the nostalgic celebration of the past.224 
In a quasi-Habermasian fashion, Boltanski suggests that emancipatory life forms 
emanate from social practices whose legitimacy is based on relatively evenly distributed, 
democratically controlled, and individually or collectively empowering – material and 
symbolic – resources for action: 
 
[…] within a given framework, an action is illegitimate when it can be characterized as 
arbitrary, that is, when it is possible to demonstrate that it depends on the will of an individual, 
a group, or an organization, capable of seizing the position of umpire, equipped with the power 
to intervene in the debate between opposed points of view, whilst seeking to determine what is 
and what counts.225 
 
Emancipatory projects are viable only to the extent that the practices by which they are 
sustained distinguish themselves in terms of their normative specificity from the disem- 
powering mechanisms permeating the social construction of reality founded on relations 
of domination. Critical actors, however, must not underestimate the integrative capacity 
of dominant ideologies. The distortive but pragmatic realism of the most influential 
players permits them to exercise hegemonic control over ideological, behavioural, and 
institutional patterns attributing legitimacy to class-divided domains of interactionality. 
Put differently, the powerful are realists: 
 
Thus, those who govern – drawing on the representations relating to a not-yet-realized, yet 
inevitable, future – are healthy realists, because they have the power to make happen what they 
predict, not only because they predict it (following the logic of a self-fulfilling prophecy) but 
also because they have a high level of information, as well as advanced performative resources, 
at their disposal.226 
 
Hence, ideology may be described as a self-fulfilling prophecy, in the sense that ‘it invents 
things in order to do things’227 – and this is what makes it ‘effective’228. The ‘economy of 
discourse and justification’229 is never completely disconnected from its social conditions 
of production – neither in terms of its roots nor in terms of its consequences. Ideology, 
therefore, is both embedded in and oriented towards social practices; it is constructed by 
meaning-producing subjects acting upon, and in relation to, reality.230 
  
  
 
14. A Power-Analytical Project 
PID was a power-analytical project.231 Seeking to go beyond the limited explanatory 
scope of the sociological approach to power relations presented in PID, Boltanski identi- 
fies two main types of domination: simple domination and complex domination. Before 
reflecting upon the latter, let us consider the former, of which – according to  Boltanski 
– there are two sub-types.232 
On the one hand, there are radical forms of ‘simple domination’, in which people are 
‘partially or completely deprived of their elementary liberties’233 and in which ‘profound 
asymmetries are maintained or created by exercising explicit and – notably, but not 
exclusively – physical violence’234. Extreme historical examples of this kind of domina- 
tion are ‘absolute slavery’235 as well as military – especially fascist – dictatorships. 
Indeed, these cases may be characterized as situations or regimes of ‘oppression’236, in 
which critique is not only marginalized but also systematically curbed and, possibly, even 
criminalized: 
 
Within situations of oppression, the eventuality of critique is simply excluded, as can be the 
mere possibility of posing questions about what is happening (‘here, we do not ask any 
questions’). With both critique and questioning expelled, justification has no place to exist 
either.237 
 
Under these circumstances, the shift from the spread of ideology to the use of violence238 
can be undertaken in order to defend the power of those individuals, or groups of indi- 
viduals, who are in control and who seek to remain in control at all costs. 
On the other hand, there are moderate forms of ‘simple domination’, which are less 
extreme than their radical parallels, in the sense that, under their umbrella, ‘critique 
appears, to some extent, possible’239, even if actors can never be sure about the kind of 
critique they are permitted to articulate, let alone about the degree to which they are 
allowed to formulate it – either in an open and uncensored, or in a clandestine and hid- 
den, manner. In this scenario, the distinction between official (officiel) and unofficial 
(officieux) justifications240 plays a pivotal role in defining what can be said in public and 
what can be said only – or not even – in private. 
In both cases, the maintenance of ‘profound asymmetries’241 (in terms of class, eth- 
nicity, gender, age, ability, etc.) is central to preserving material and symbolic structures 
based on social domination, often through disempowering mechanisms of oppression and 
exploitation.242 Perhaps most importantly, however, at the heart of all forms of ‘sim- ple 
domination’ lies ‘the refusal to change’243, representing an authoritarian position that, in 
the most extreme-case scenarios, is defended in ‘the state of war against the perpetual 
enemy from within’244. 
The development of ‘complex domination’, by contrast, is vital to the efficient and 
legitimized performance of ‘contemporary capitalist-democratic societies’245. In fact, 
‘[t]he democratic market societies – that is, those compatible with the functioning of 
capitalism – have constructed their political ideal in opposition to [the] model of domina- 
tion’246 that may be characterized as ‘simple’. Complex forms of domination are subject 
to ‘an imperative of justification’247. As a consequence, ‘critique can make itself heard’248. 
  
  
 
More specifically, what emerges is ‘the establishment of a new type of relation between 
institution and critique’249, that is, ‘the incorporation of the latter into the routines of 
social life’250. On this account, critique constitutes a major driving force of, rather than 
an obstacle to, the dynamic development of advanced capitalist societies, which are 
capable of enduring symbolic and systemic adjustment processes if and where these are 
deemed necessary. Given the pivotal role played by critique, individual and collective 
actors have to undergo ‘selection tests’251, which, in the grand scheme of things, serve to 
reinforce the multiple ‘profound asymmetries’252 permeating intersectionally stratified 
societies. Although, under regimes of complex or managerial domination, the legitimacy 
of these asymmetries can be called into question, their existence tends to be defended not 
by virtue of ‘repressive violence’253 but ‘by other pacific means’254 – notably on the basis 
of ideological, behavioural, and institutional patterns of social regulation. 
One of the principal problems arising from the discrepancy between ‘formal equality’ 
and ‘substantive equality’ is that, in most cases, the opportunities promised by advocates 
of the former do not match the outcomes envisaged by supporters of the latter. The 
hegemonic spirit pervading contemporary forms of capitalism follows ‘a neo-liberal 
logic’255, according to which it is possible to ‘blame the victim’256 and appeal to people’s 
‘individual responsibility’257, instead of accounting for ‘the weight of the constraints that 
operate at a collective level’258. The various target-oriented strategies – including the 
‘psychological technologies of the management of human resources’259 – are designed to 
make individuals function in accordance with the prescribed benchmark-driven logic of 
neo-liberal regimes of governance. In such an environment, radical critique is degraded 
to an appendage of a self-referential system that has succeeded in converting processes 
of argumentation and justification into self-fulfilling prophecies, thereby confirming the 
empirical validity of the normative parameters underlying social mechanisms of com- 
modified administration and administered commodification. 
 
15. A Cutting-Edge Project 
PID was a cutting-edge project.260 The shift from ‘avowed conservatism’ to ‘progressive 
conservatism’ is reflected in the emergence of a new mode of domination, which consists 
in ‘changing in order to preserve, appealing to necessity and drawing upon a governance 
of experts’261. Given its detailed analysis of this crucial feature of ‘progressive conserva- 
tism’, PID ‘is more timely than ever’262. What needs to be added to the picture, however, 
is the emergence of neo-managerial forms of power and control, which are of paramount 
importance to the ‘new spirit of capitalism’. This new spirit is impregnated with the 
 
demands […] that emerged from the May movement, which prompted the management, in the 
1980s, to attach great value to workers’ individual initiative and to advocate forms of 
‘autonomy’, which quickly turned out to replace the control close to the framing of the first 
level with (less costly) self-control […], informational control mechanisms exercised at a 
distance, demonstrating the return of a sophisticated version of Taylorism […].263 
 
Under the umbrella of this ‘new spirit’, it appears that the ‘ideological eloquence’264 of 
modern metanarratives is no longer required: 
  
  
 
[…] the deepening of the new regime of governance, founded on the authority of experts and 
on the dispossession/resignation of representatives, has rendered ideological eloquence simply 
obsolete.265 
 
In such a neo-managerial climate, it becomes evident that ‘jurisdictional, complex frame- 
works, controlled by systems of evaluation, built upon track records (benchmarking)’,266 
become a taken-for-granted component of a new culture driven by micro-economic and 
neo-classical imperatives.267 The Humboldtian ideal of universal and comprehensive 
education, based on people’s wide-ranging exposure to key aspects of the natural and 
human sciences, seems to have been replaced by the increasing influence of business 
school models268, in which value rationality (Wertrationalität) is secondary to purposive 
rationality (Zweckrationalität).269 Ironically, it appears that neo-managerialism serves 
the therapeutic function of the collective experience of psychoanalysis: 
 
Management has had a liberating effect on the practical aspects underlying the new elites’ 
affairs, which is comparable to the effect that the diffusion of psychoanalysis has had on their 
sexual practices.270 
 
The arrival of the ‘new spirit of capitalism’ marks the advent of a ‘new era of liberation’, 
regardless of how inflationary the meaning of this term may have become in the neo- 
managerial world of categorical flexibility and constant transformation. And yet, behind 
the euphemistic language of ‘openness’, ‘change’, and ‘dynamism’ lurk both competi- 
tiveness, as an ideal, and competition, as a reality. In the face of the increasing individu- 
alization of societies that are governed by neo-liberal regimes and, in many cases, hit by 
austerity programmes271, it has become a given to ‘put everyone in competition with 
everyone else and, thereby, fragment realms whose only defensive resource would be 
union’272. The gradual ‘withdrawal of the state’273 from the economy – that is, the end of 
Keynesian state-interventionism – signals the emergence of a new type of domination: 
 
[…] this new form of domination […], a reorientation of the state’s modes of action, permitting 
it to serve the interests of a type of capitalism that has itself been profoundly modified. Whilst 
capitalism’s ‘spirit’ has been changing, the state has had to change its own spirit too.274 
 
It seems, then, that in the era of this ‘new spirit of capitalism’ – inextricably linked to the 
rise of neo-liberalism and neo-managerialism – ‘the “end of ideologies”, prophe- sied for 
the past fifty years, has become a reality’275. This is not to suggest that ideolo- gies have 
become irrelevant, let alone that they have disappeared. Rather, this is to acknowledge 
that, when considering the role of the grand political ideologies that shaped large-scale 
social developments during the 19th and 20th centuries (namely, anarchism, 
communism/socialism, liberalism, conservatism, and fascism), only one of them can be 
declared to be – at least provisionally – triumphant in the contemporary era: liberalism. 
Given its victorious status, it may not come as a surprise that, ‘[i]f nowadays there 
remains a class conscious of itself, it is the dominant class, rather than any other class’276. 
On this view, the only class that, in the strict sense, remains both ‘a class in itself’ and ‘a 
class for itself’ (that is, a class that exists both objectively, regard- less of its awareness 
of itself, and subjectively, depending on its awareness of itself)   is 
  
  
 
the ‘global dominant class’277. For it is not the – increasingly weakened and fragmented 
– working class but the – gradually more strengthened and self-confident 
– dominant class that dictates the parameters and agendas intended to reinforce the 
worldwide consolidation of the ‘new spirit of  capitalism’. 
 
16. A Normative Project 
PID was a normative project.278 As such, it was motivated by the assumption that – as 
Bourdieu famously put it – ‘sociology is a martial art’279. Boltanski has serious misgiv- 
ings about this metaphor, not only because, as he admits, he is not fond of sports, but 
also, more importantly, because he rejects the idea of associating the production of intel- 
lectual work with a strategic game based on competition.280 To his mind, the whole point 
of the pursuit of critical sociological research is to expose the instrumental imper- atives 
by which powerful social fields – especially economic and political ones – are governed. 
In order to do justice to this normative mission, sociology needs to be conceived of as 
a discipline that is (a) empirical, (b) investigative, (c) uncovering, (d) demystifying, and 
(e) reflexive. 
 
(a) As an empirical discipline, it is committed to ‘doing research’281 founded on real-
world investigations, such as field work, surveys, interviews, statistical anal- ysis, 
or archival work282 – to mention only a few methods of sociological enquiry. 
(b) As an investigative discipline, it is driven by ‘the requirement of truth’283, derived 
from the logical and methodical consideration of knowledge claims whose valid- 
ity needs to be assessed in terms of plausibility and evidence.284 
(c) As an uncovering discipline, it is motivated by the ambition to unearth underly- 
ing – value-, power-, and interest-laden – mechanisms, which are covered under 
the appearance of ‘reality’, but which shape the development of the ‘world’ that 
lurks behind every form of sociality.285 
(d) As a demystifying discipline, it is concerned with exposing not only the relative 
arbitrariness of material and symbolic constellations in the social world, but also 
the distorting effects produced by daily routines allowing for the emergence of 
interactional patterns based on taken-for-grantedness.286 
(e) As a reflexive discipline, it is confronted with the self-critical challenge of under- 
taking an epistemological break with both scholastic and ordinary understand- 
ings of the world, whilst examining its own – relationally defined – position, as 
well as its own – normatively constituted – functions, in the social universe. 
 
It is the task of critical sociology not only to question the apparent givenness of reality, but 
also to imagine viable ways of improving the conditions of existence for all members of 
humanity. Thus, if necessary, it needs to contribute to ‘making reality unacceptable’287 by 
grappling with ‘its contradictions, its opacities, and its asymmetries’288 and, hence, by 
insisting upon its inherent fragility, which is reflected in its transformability.289 Sociology, 
understood in these terms, is a ‘fight’290 in the sense that it seeks to participate in, and to 
throw its weight behind, the struggles that are aimed at empowering the disempowered in 
  
  
 
the name and interest of a common humanity, rather than of group-specific minorities. In 
short, there is no human emancipation without its protagonists’ capacity to overcome the 
arbitrary chains of social division and separation, which are both concealed and perpetu- 
ated by ideologically constituted modes of distortion, validation, and legitimization. 
 
Summary 
The concept of ideology has been widely discussed in the humanities and social sci- 
ences.291 One of the main reasons why it would be no exaggeration to suggest that PID 
constitutes one of the most original contributions to late 20th-century French sociology 
is that it provides a remarkably astute account of the principal functions of dominant 
ideologies in advanced capitalist societies.292 Indeed, both PID and RRI are forceful 
reminders of the fact that the ‘dominant ideology thesis’ – according to which ‘the domi- 
nant ideology is the ideology of the dominant groups in society’ – is far from obsolete. In 
addition to challenging the reductionist presuppositions underpinning Marxist- 
functionalist approaches to ideology, however, PID anticipates a number of crucial 
insights into the transformation of systems of domination, notably in relation to the 
capacity of neo-liberal regimes to function in accordance with the motto ‘change in order 
to preserve’. Boltanski’s commentary, RRI, is intellectually useful in sharpening our 
understanding of a Bourdieusian conception of ideology critique, which lies at the heart 
of the analysis developed in PID.293 The key insights gained from the previous study can 
be summarized as follows: 
 
1. Ideology critique is scientific in the sense that it needs to make use of logical 
descriptions, rational explanations, and methodical evaluations in order to break 
with value-, power-, and interest-laden misperceptions, misconceptions, and 
misrepresentations. 
2. Ideology critique is non-conventional in the sense that, in order to be genuinely 
radical, it needs to challenge the orthodox rationale pervading hegemonic pat- 
terns of cognition and action, which perpetuate systems of social domination. 
3. Ideology critique is reflexive in the sense that it needs to undertake an epistemo- 
logical rupture with both the ‘scholastic attitude’ of abstract philosophy, by 
engaging with empirical reality, and the ‘naïve attitude’ of concrete experience, 
by defending the epistemic superiority of research-based claims to validity. 
4. Ideology critique is work-in-progress in the sense that – irrespective of how 
sophisticated and useful its conceptual and methodological tools for the study of 
sets of principles and values may be – it constitutes an open-ended process, with 
no indisputable conclusions, let alone ultimate revelations. 
5. Ideology critique is autonomist in the sense that it seeks to free itself from the 
material and symbolic constraints that hegemonic systems of control and regula- 
tion impose upon processes of social integration. 
6. Ideology critique is counter-hegemonic in the sense that its task is to contest the 
epistemic validity, as well as the social legitimacy, of dominant symbolic forms 
that emerge in relation to a given reality. 
7. Ideology critique is relationalist in the sense that it exposes the assembled 
constitution of  social reality,  characterized by  subjectless heterogeneity  and 
  
  
 
intersectionality, rather than by the monolithic force of an ontological epicentre 
determining all forms of human agency. 
8. Ideology critique is constructivist in the sense that it insists that all social arrange- 
ments – including divisions between actors – are historically contingent and, 
hence, relatively arbitrary, rather than ‘naturally’ or ‘biologically’ determined. 
9. Ideology critique is critical in the sense that it aims to shed light on the underly- 
ing structural forces by which purposive and discursive performances are shaped. 
10. Ideology critique is emancipatory in the sense that it seeks to contribute to the 
construction of principles, practices, and life forms capable of liberating human 
actors from illegitimate sources of disempowerment. 
11. Ideology critique is undogmatic in the sense that it faces up to a multiplicity of 
sociological variables – such as class, ethnicity, gender, age, and ability – which 
structure people’s sense of identity as well as their understanding of reality. 
12. Ideology critique is materialist in the sense that it highlights the central role that 
class continues to play in the stratification of capitalist societies. 
13. Ideology critique is historicist in the sense that it contextualizes the taken-for- 
granted nature of culturally specific systems that obstruct the possibility of social 
practices whose legitimacy is founded on relatively evenly distributed, demo- 
cratically controlled, and – individually or collectively – empowering resources 
for action. 
14. Ideology critique is power-analytical in the sense that it aims to provide nuanced 
accounts of all forms of social domination – regardless of whether they are sim- 
ple or complex, authoritarian or democratic, dictatorial or liberal, repressive or 
tolerant, violent or structural, overt or subtle. 
15. Ideology critique is cutting-edge in the sense that it succeeds in accounting for 
the adaptive and transformative capacities developed by efficient systems of 
domination. 
16. Ideology critique is normative in the sense that it is concerned not only with the 
question of how things are, including the ways in which they are concealed by 
interest-driven frameworks of distortion, but also with the question of how things 
ought to be, comprising the ways in which they should be revealed by virtue of 
illuminating frameworks of interpretation and explanation. 
 
Perspectives 
Considering the aforementioned insights, the crucial question that remains is to what 
extent PID can be linked to key concerns in contemporary sociology and social theory. 
Following the structure of the preceding analysis, we may push the debate forward      by 
reflecting upon several issues that fail to receive sufficient attention by Bourdieu and 
Boltanski in their otherwise original and insightful enquiry into the complexities charac- 
terizing the daily production of ideology: 
 
1. Scientific versus ordinary? Rather than assuming that there is a clear-cut separa- 
tion between ‘the scientific’ and ‘the ordinary’, we need to recognize that these 
two levels of cognitive engagement with reality form part of an epistemic con- 
tinuum. Both scientific and ordinary types of knowledge are context-, meaning-, 
  
  
 
perspective-, value-, power-, and interest-laden. For all claims to objective, 
normative, or subjective validity are raised by socially situated actors, whose 
symbolically mediated assertions are embedded in – implicitly or explicitly 
mobilized – frameworks of ideology. 
2. Orthodox versus heterodox? Rather than suggesting that ‘the orthodox’ and ‘the 
heterodox’ are entirely divorced from one another, we need to conceive of them 
not only as interdependent but also as mutually overlapping. In order to be adapt- 
able, orthodox ideologies need to be capable of incorporating elements from het- 
erodox ideologies, and vice versa. In other words, the long-term viability of both 
orthodox and heterodox sets of assumptions and principles depends on their 
capacity to draw upon, and make use of, insights and convictions from competing 
interpretations of reality. 
3. Philosophical versus sociological? Rather than artificially disconnecting ‘the 
philosophical’ and ‘the sociological’ from one another, we need to regard them as 
mutually inclusive. Philosophy without sociology is empty, and sociology without 
philosophy is blind. Research-inspired reflexivity requires knowledge-generating 
entities to overcome counterproductive disciplinary boundaries, thereby encour- 
aging them to step outside of their epistemic comfort zones and to distrust the 
dogmatic celebration of self-fulfilling prophecies. 
4. Objective versus subjective? Rather than insisting that the  explanation of  ‘the 
objective’ and the interpretation of ‘the subjective’ constitute two dissoci- ated 
levels of enquiry, we need to take on the task of cross-fertilizing them. Factual 
forces ‘in themselves’ and self-conscious forces ‘for themselves’ form two 
irreducible  components  of  the  human  world.  Critical  social  science  is a 
constant ‘work in progress’, suspicious of bold announcements concerning 
ultimate revelations and, instead, determined to shed light on the dynamic 
interplay between objective and subjective factors in spatiotemporally situated 
processes of human  actualization. 
5. Autonomous versus heteronomous? Rather than giving the misleading impres- 
sion that ‘the autonomous’ and ‘the heteronomous’ designate two wholly distinc- 
tive spheres of social existence, we need to comprehend the extent to which they 
are intertwined. The most emancipatory spaces of autonomy cannot escape the 
influence of structural mechanisms reinforcing the power of heteronomy, just as 
the most repressive sources of heteronomy cannot annihilate the human need for 
a sense of autonomy. Ideologies can be mobilized either to conceal or to uncover 
the tension-laden composition of contradictory realities. 
6. Hegemonic versus counter-hegemonic? Rather than presupposing that ‘the 
hegemonic’ and ‘the counter-hegemonic’ can be portrayed as always fulfilling 
diametrically opposed normative functions, we need to acknowledge that both 
can legitimize either emancipatory or repressive sets of practices. The fact that 
an ideology is hegemonic does not make it repressive, just as the fact that an 
ideology is counter-hegemonic does not make it emancipatory. The business of 
ideology is pursued by those who have an interest in disseminating their own sets 
of values and principles, irrespective of whether they are hegemonic or counter-
hegemonic. 
  
  
 
7. Substantial versus relational? Rather than positing that ‘the substantial’ and ‘the 
relational’ denote two disconnected spheres of human existence, we need to 
explore the extent to which they are entangled. Social entities are unthinkable 
without social relations, just as social relations are inconceivable without social 
entities. The meaning of social entities is, by definition, relationally constituted. 
Notwithstanding the degree of their spatiotemporal contingency, there are no co- 
existential realities without underlying ontologies. 
8. Natural versus social? Rather than aiming to draw a straightforward distinc- 
tion between ‘the natural’ and ‘the social’, we need to concede that the bound- 
aries between these two spheres of existence are blurred. Our participation in 
society is confined by the objective constraints of the natural world, just as our 
immersion in nature is mediated by the normative parameters of the social 
world. 
9. Descriptive versus normative? Rather than drawing an unambiguous demarca- 
tion line between ‘the descriptive’ and ‘the normative’, we need to grapple with 
these two fundamental realms of investigation in relation to each other. Instead of 
reducing the purpose of sociological research to the target of providing mirror- 
like representations of human reality, we need to take on the challenge of generat- 
ing evaluative accounts capable of assessing the legitimacy of relationally 
constituted constructions in terms of their existential value and discursive defen- 
sibility. Social arrangements are not only constructible and reconstructible, but 
also assessable and criticizable. Sociology without critique would be just as 
pointless as social life without criticism. Whether as sociologists or as ordinary 
actors, we cannot face up to the construction of reality without implicitly recog- 
nizing its ineluctable fragility and contestability. 
10. Regressive versus progressive? Rather than classifying particular belief systems 
or sets of practices either as totally ‘regressive’ and ‘backward-looking’ or as 
exclusively ‘progressive’ and ‘forward-looking’, we need to confront the com- 
plexity of society by taking note of the fact that its manifold components are 
tension-laden and contradictory. The illusion of typological purity is shattered in 
the face of the multi-layered constitution permeating both material and symbolic 
constructions of reality. Ideology critique can be emancipatory only to the extent 
that it allows for the critique of ideology critique. Truly critical critics are no less 
critical of themselves than they are of others, as well as of the circumstances that 
they may share, or may not share, with them. 
11. Monocentric versus polycentric? Rather than reducing the social universe to a 
sphere of interactions that are ultimately determined either by a ‘monocentric’ or 
by a ‘polycentric’ structuration of power, we need to account for its intersectional 
configuration, which – in a radical sense – is centreless. Composed of   multiple 
– not always coherently organized – elements, the social world is devoid of an 
interactional epicentre. Given the diversity of interconnected sociological factors 
and given the historical indeterminacy derived from the civilizational force of 
human agency, the analysis of relationally constituted realities must be open to 
constant revision. The only acceptable dogma within critical sociological research 
is the commitment to de-dogmatization. 
  
  
 
12. Material versus symbolic? Rather than opposing ‘the material’ and ‘the sym- 
bolic’ to one another, we need to conceive of ‘infrastructural’ and ‘superstruc- 
tural’ dimensions emerging within human life forms as two constitutive elements 
of the social world. In highly differentiated and asymmetrically structured socie- 
ties, struggles over both material and symbolic resources remain central to the 
distribution of wealth, status, and power – and so do the ideologies designed to 
defend the interests of those involved in these struggles. 
13. Contextual versus transcendental? Rather than misrepresenting ‘the contextual’ 
and ‘the transcendental’ as diametrically opposed aspects of reality, we need to 
grasp their interrelatedness. The spatiotemporal contingency of social reality does 
not eliminate the force of universality, which, by definition, rises above the 
limited horizon of circumstantial determinacy. The fact that all social practices 
and social structures are embedded in particular historical settings does not con- 
tradict the fact that they possess both context-immanent and context-transcendent 
facets, which pervade their respective modes of functioning. 
14. Fatalistic versus idealistic? Rather than advocating either a ‘fatalistic’ or an ‘ide- 
alistic’ conception of the human world, we need to endorse a position of socio- 
ontological realism. There is no point in hypostatizing the influence of power, as 
if it constituted the determining force behind every social action, or in denying 
the existence of power, as if it could be removed from social life. Instead, it is 
imperative to take power seriously without overestimating or underestimating its 
sociological significance. Socio-ontological idealism, which portrays everyday 
life as a power-free realm of pristine intersubjectivity, is just as problematic as 
socio-ontological fatalism, which implies that all human actions are ultimately 
driven by struggles over access to material or symbolic resources. Socio- 
ontological realism, by contrast, permits us to recognize the simultaneous exist- 
ence of the power-laden and the power-critical elements of social life.294 
1ra5d. itTional versus modern? Rather than presuming that ‘traditional’ and ‘mod- 
ern’ forms of attributing meaning to the world are located in two utterly detached 
domains of action and reflection, we need to do justice to the fact that present-day 
practices and belief systems cannot be properly understood in isolation from 
those of the past. Dominant ideologies can assert their hegemonic position to the 
degree that, if necessary, they prove to be capable not only of shaping and con- 
trolling social conditions, whose underlying functions they aim to obscure, but 
also of responding and adapting to real and potential social changes, whose 
direction they seek to influence and, if possible, even steer. In order to reinforce 
the privileged position of those who benefit from the asymmetrical arrangements 
of an established social order, the modus operandi endorsed by a dominant ideol- 
ogy needs to be converted into the modus vivendi of a given society. Its long-term 
viability, however, hinges on its ability to adjust to the shifting parameters of 
constantly changing realities. 
16. Practical versus theoretical? Rather than conceiving of ‘the practical’ and ‘the 
theoretical’ as two opposing elements of social life in general and of social research 
in particular, we need to consider them as two complementary parts of one and the 
same process: the construction of materially embedded and symbolically mediated 
  
  
 
modes of existence. Critical social science engages with the relationally organized 
conditions of human reality in various ways; the point of emancipatory ideologies 
is to shape and, if necessary, to change them in accordance with human – that is, 
both theoretically and practically universalizable – interests. 
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283. Ibid., p. 176 (italics added) (my translation); original text: ‘une exigence de vérité’. 
284. In this sense, it makes sense to distinguish between ‘validity claims’ in science and ‘legitimacy claims’ 
in politics. On this point, see ibid., p. 176: ‘[…] le discours politique nous semblait toujours trop rapide, 
trop séducteur, trop variable, trop léger, livre à l’opinion’. 
285. On this point, see ibid., p. 176: ‘[…] la vocation de la sociologie […] comme un combat pour le 
dévoilement de la réalité’. 
286. On this point, see ibid., pp. 176–177. 
287. Ibid., p. 178 (italics in original) (my translation); original text: ‘rendre la réalité inacceptable’. 
288. Ibid., p. 178 (my translation); original text: ‘ses contradictions, ses opacités et ses asymétries’. 
289. See Boltanski, Rennes, and Susen (2010), esp. p. 161. 
290. Boltanski (2008), p. 178 (my translation); original text: ‘combat’. 
291. On the concept of ideology, see, for instance: Abercrombie, Hill, and Turner (1980); Abercrombie, 
Hill, and Turner (1990); Apel (1971a); Apel (1971b); Arnason (2000); Bohman (1986); Boltanski 
  
  
 
(2008);  Bourdieu  and  Boltanski  (2008  [1976]);  Chiapello  and  Fairclough  (2002); Conde-Costas 
(1991); Disco (1979); Eagleton (2006 [1976]); Eagleton (2007 [1991]); Gadamer (1971);   Habermas 
(1971 [1968]); Hartmann (1970); Haug (1999); Honneth (2007); Inglis (2013), esp. pp. 320–322; 
Inglis and Thorpe (2012), Chapter 3; Jakubowski (1990 [1976]); Larrain (1991 [1983]); Lee  (1992); 
Marx and Engels (1953 [1845–1847]); Marx and Engels (2000/1977 [1846]); Mongardini (1992); 
Overend (1978); Quiniou (1996); Rehmann (2004); Reitz (2004); Simons and Billig (1994); Susen 
(2014d); Susen (2015a), Chapter 2; Thompson (1984); Thompson (1990); Van Dijk (1998); Wacquant 
(2002 [1993]); Weber (1995); Wolff (2004); Žižek (1989); Žižek (1994). 
292. On this point, see Susen (2014d), esp. pp. 96–109. 
293. Of course, since the publication of PID in 1976, Boltanski has developed and revised his sociologi- cal 
positions on several levels, notably in relation to Bourdieu’s approach. In this context, it is worth 
emphasizing that Boltanski’s intellectual trajectory has gone through different stages. We may distin- 
guish three phases that are particularly relevant to his development as a scholar: 
  The initial phase is based on the studies that Boltanski published in the late 1960s and through- 
out the 1970s. This period may be characterized as ‘Boltanski’s Bourdieusian phase’. See, for 
instance: Boltanski (1969); Boltanski (1970); Boltanski (1973); Boltanski (1975); Boltanski 
(1982); Bourdieu and Boltanski (1975a); Bourdieu and Boltanski (1975b); Bourdieu and 
Boltanski (1976); Bourdieu, Boltanski, Castel, and Chamboredon (1965); Bourdieu, Boltanski 
and De Saint Martin (1973).  The middle phase is based on the studies that Boltanski published during the 1980s and – 
particularly – during the 1990s. This period may be referred to as ‘Boltanski’s post- or anti- 
Bourdieusian phase’. See, for instance: Boltanski (1990a); Boltanski (1990b); Boltanski (1993); 
Boltanski (1998); Boltanski (1999–2000); Boltanski (2002); Boltanski (2004); Boltanski (2006); 
Boltanski and Chiapello (1999); Boltanski and Thévenot (1983); Boltanski and Thévenot 
(1991); Boltanski and Thévenot (1999).  The most recent phase designates his latest stage, that is, that of ‘the Boltanski of the early 
21st century’. This period may be described as ‘the phase of Boltanski’s reconciliation with 
Bourdieu’. See, in particular: Boltanski (2008); Boltanski (2009); Boltanski and Honneth 
(2009); Boltanski, Rennes, and Susen (2010). 
 
On this three-stage account of Boltanski’s intellectual trajectory, see Fowler (2014). See also Susen 
(2014b), p. 49, and Susen (2014c), pp. 613–621. 
 
294.     On this point, see, for example: Susen (2007), pp. 14, 22, 54, 115, 121–125, 217, 221–226, 227 n.  10, 
239, 253, 267, 277, 304, and 312; Susen (2013c), pp. 229–230; Susen (2013d), pp. 327, 328, 333, 335, 
354, 362, 372, and 373. 
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